to these two propositions, i. e. the above
questions, will, and must, decide the whole controversy.

"Now, were it not for the internal evidences which the writings of the
New Testament do, and ever will, possess (the external evidences
falling so far short of being conclusive in my mind, as I shall show
more fully hereafter, when I come to speak of those evidences) I
should still be inclined, in my own understanding, to reject the
latter proposition in each of the above questions, and adhere to the
former.--Much of the external evidence, I am very ready to admit is
perfectly consistent with the supposed truth of the internal, but
after all, in my humble opinion, it does not quite come to the point.
But the internal evidence, I confess, I cannot withstand. The more I
investigate the subject, the more I discover its force, its clearness,
and its irresistibility; and although the truth it unfolds is so
august, so momentous, so astonishingly and inexpressibly sublime, that
it is with the profoundest and most reverential awe I speak, when I
acknowledge my faith in the divine origin of those testimonies; yet,
as I cannot resist their force, so I am obliged to acknowledge them
true. The illusion, however, if it be one, I know is happifying to the
mind; but this is no good reason, that I know of, why we should either
embrace it ourselves, or propagate it in the world. Although I have
endeavoured to calm my conscience, while meditating on my doubts, with
the consideration that I am not accountable for the truth or the
falsity of the scriptures; yet, I must confess, this did not fully
satisfy my mind; and therefore I come to a determination to be more
thoroughly persuaded of their truth, if possible, or else be more
thoroughly convinced of their fallacy. With this motive I entered on
the present controversy; and I feel very happy in its termination,
having been much strengthened in my faith thereby, and humbly pray,
that should it ever come before the public, it may be blest to the
benefit of others.

"2d. What you have said on the divine mission, &c. of the apostles is
satisfactory. For although it has not fully come to my question, yet
it has had the same good effect by convincing me that my question went
a little beyond the bounds of reason; for it was too much like asking
a blind man how it is that other men see! It is not reasonable to
suppose that the apostles themselves could have informed persons who
were uninspired to their understanding, how or by what means, they
were inspired. It was sufficient to demonstrate the fact by the works
which they were enabled to perform, (admitting the account true,) in
the name of JESUS.

"3d. My argument respecting a hope of future existence has been
extended rather beyond my design. Without taking up time to
recapitulate, I will only say I admit the truth of your argument on
this subject; neither do I see how it stands altogether in opposition
to mine. What I contend for is this. The idea of non-existence, i.e.
of existing only in God, without retaining our individual
consciousness of being, does not, like the idea of endless misery,
absolutely destroy our present comforts. It only cuts short, or else
prevents, future prospects. If it can be demonstrated, as I believe it
can, that God is good to the animal creation, in giving them
existence, on the supposition, that they have no future state, I
contend that man is equally, if not more abundantly blessed, even on
the same supposition.--But I never meant to contend that eternal life
would not be still infinitely better, according to our conceptions of
good, if true. To state a case, which will illustrate in some degree
my ideas of this subject, the following may come something nigh it;
viz. I should be pleased with the idea of living, say, ten years, in
reference only to the blessing of this life, although I might know I
should die at that time, provided that, during the ten years, I should
enjoy the common blessings of life. This does not prevent my desiring
to live longer; neither does a certain knowledge that I shall not
prevent me from desiring to live, nor from being pleased with the idea
of living, till that time. But let me know for a certainty, or, which
would be the same thing to me, let me absolutely believe that I should
live fifty years, and that although the ten first would be attended
with all the common blessings of life, as usual, yet that the
remaining forty years, which would be the remaining whole of my
natural life, I should be placed in the most distressed and aggravated
circumstances, of which I could possibly conceive; now, in reference
to the whole fifty years, could I desire to live? No! I say, I rather
choose instant death!

"When I look around on the circumstances and condition of men, I am so
fully convinced that the aggregate of happiness so far overbalances
the aggregate of misery, that I am firmly of opinion, yea, I do not
entertain the least possible doubt of its truth, and therefore think I
ever shall contend, that this life is a blessing, and we have abundant
reason to be very thankful for it, without the least reference to a
future state. But, nevertheless, I am very ready to admit, that, when
futurity and immortality are taken into the account, and are connected
with the same view of the character of the Deity, these blessings are
all extended and magnified to infinity.

"But on the supposition that truth is any where connected with
_endless misery_, the scene is wholly changed. On this supposition I
am not reconciled to truth at all; I can find nothing in my moral
nature, which I call good, but what stands directly opposed to it;
Hence, the very brightest and most brilliant part of the picture is
deformed by the awful idea; it takes away all the pleasure of
investigation, and if this be truth, my only desire and prayer to God,
is that I might be permitted to remain eternally ignorant of it! It is
my confidence therefore in the goodness of the truth, and this only,
which has reconciled my mind to it. You may contend that I have not
obtained this confidence without the knowledge of divine revelation.
Be that as it may; on this supposition only I am reconciled, and
something must destroy this confidence before I can become
unreconciled to truth. I think now I must be fully understood, and
will therefore add no more on this subject.

"4th. What you say under the fourth article is satisfactory. Errors,
no doubt, may be, and often are committed by applying instructions
'differently from their primary design.'

"5th. Your remarks under the sixth article are very judicious. Much
injury no doubt is often done to the truth of divine revelation by
contending so tenaciously as some do for things, which, if true, are
not essential to its support.--It is often the case that, by trying to
prove too much, we weaken the evidence, in the minds of many,
respecting the main thing we wish to establish. Hence, the opposer,
not being able, or else not disposed, to make proper distinction,
considers it all of one piece; and not being able to see the propriety
of many things, which are contended for with equal zeal, sets the
whole down as a fallacy.

"6th. It is true, I thought you strained the argument a little too far
in supposing that the apostles could not have been convinced of the
truth of the resurrection by any evidence which could be
counterbalanced. This induced me to state that supposed absurdity in
still more glaring colors, with a hope that you would thereby be
induced to take a review of your argument, and not without some
expectation, that you would be able to see some defects in it. But in
this I have been disappointed. You still hold on upon your argument,
and turn the error wholly on your friend.

"But, as this is the turning point, I shall not blame you for
straining every nerve, and holding on upon every fibre which gives you
the least possible support.

"It would not do for you to give up the idea that the apostles could
not have been convinced of the truth of the resurrection by any
evidence which could have existed short of the fact's being true;
(which, by the way, was what I meant by the first member of my
criticism, though not exactly so expressed;) for the moment this is
admitted, doubt and unbelief will soon contend that they were so
convinced. Imagination may soon call up such evidence in the mind,
without supposing any thing miraculous, and all the rest of the
account may be supposed to be fictitious. I did not mean to insinuate,
however, that you have contended that the apostles must have seen
Jesus rise in order to be convinced of the fact. I suppose their
seeing him after he was risen was as full a demonstration to them as
though they had seen him rise. And if they could not have been
convinced of its truth by any thing short of this, then they could not
be convinced by any thing short of the fact; i.e. what was the same to
them as the fact. The second member of my criticism, viz. 'If the fact
did exist there is no evidence which can counterbalance it,' does not,
as I conceive, suppose that you contend 'that the fact of the
resurrection could not exist without proving itself to the apostles in
such a way that no evidence could counterbalance it;' but it supposes
that if the fact did exist, no evidence could prove that it did not
exist, as it is always difficult to prove a negative, and utterly
impossible when the positive is true.--Hence my conclusion; viz. As
the apostles were convinced of the truth of the resurrection, which
they could not have been only by evidence which could not have existed
had not the fact been true, the fact did exist. How far does this
criticism fall short of my other? (for it is exactly what I meant by
my other.) Or how far does it go beyond your argument?

"Finally, I cannot conceive of any evidence